Abstract
In a recent paper [2], Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger claim to prove the possibility of non-empirical theory confirmation via the No Alternatives Argument. In this note, I argue that from an empiricist point of view, their "proof" begs the question in the sense that it cannot convince someone who has not already been convinced of non-empirical theory confirmation before.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 37-50 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Kriterion |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Bayesian networks
- Empiricism
- No alternatives argument (NAA)
- Principle of indifference
- Theory confirmation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
Cite this
- APA
- Author
- BIBTEX
- Harvard
- Standard
- RIS
- Vancouver