Abstract
In this paper, I develop and defend a moralized conception of epistemic trust in science against a particular kind of non-moral account defended by John (2015, 2018). I suggest that non-epistemic value considerations, non-epistemic norms of communication and affective trust properly characterize the relationship of epistemic trust between scientific experts and non-experts. I argue that it is through a moralized account of epistemic trust in science that we can make sense of the deep-seated moral undertones that are often at play when non-experts (dis)trust science.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 21 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Science and engineering ethics |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| E-pub ahead of print | 24 May 2024 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2024 |
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being
Keywords
- Epistemic responsibility
- Epistemic trust in science
- Experts
- Moral obligation
- Non-experts
- Science communication
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Health(social science)
- Issues, ethics and legal aspects
- Health Policy
- Management of Technology and Innovation
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