Uncertainties, Values, and Climate Targets

Mathias Frisch

doi:10.1086/710538

Uncertainties, Values, and Climate Targets

Mathias Frisch^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Institute of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer review

Abstract

Using climate policy debates as a case study, I argue that a certain response to the argument from inductive risk, the hedging defense, runs afoul of a reasonable ethical principle: the no-passing-the-buck principle according to which scientists ought to offer their scientific judgment when such judgment is both possible and needed in public policy debates.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	979-990
Number of pages	12
Journal	Philosophy of Science
Volume	87
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1086/710538
Publication status	Published - Dec 2020

UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 13 Climate Action

ASJC Scopus subject areas

History
Philosophy
History and Philosophy of Science

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10.1086/710538

Cite this

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abstract = "Using climate policy debates as a case study, I argue that a certain response to the argument from inductive risk, the hedging defense, runs afoul of a reasonable ethical principle: the no-passing-the-buck principle according to which scientists ought to offer their scientific judgment when such judgment is both possible and needed in public policy debates.",

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AB - Using climate policy debates as a case study, I argue that a certain response to the argument from inductive risk, the hedging defense, runs afoul of a reasonable ethical principle: the no-passing-the-buck principle according to which scientists ought to offer their scientific judgment when such judgment is both possible and needed in public policy debates.

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M3 - Article

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Uncertainties, Values, and Climate Targets

Abstract

UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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